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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND OF JURISDICTION
This case presents an appeal of the final judgment entered
in the trial court by the Honorable Judge David L. Mower, in
the Criminal Department of the Tenth Circuit Court for Kane
County, Utah, on October 8, 1987, and of that same Court's
Order, dated December 14, 1987, denying the Defendant's Motion
to Set Aside Conviction and Grant a New Trial.

The Utah Court

of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
the authority of Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals and the provisions of Utah Code Section 78-2a-3, subsection (2)(c) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Three issues are presented by this appeal:
1) Were the constitutional rights of the Defendant, protected by both the Constitution of the State of Utah and the
Constitution of the United States of America, to due process
of the law, to present a defense on his behalf in person and
by counsel, and to a fair trial of the criminal charges brought
against him, abridged, infringed, prejudiced, and ultimately
denied as a result of the negligence and/or incompetence of
Defendant's counsel in failing to subpoena witnesses to testify
in the Defendant's behalf and in failing to insure that the
charges against the Defendant were tried before an impartial
jury?
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2)

Did the Tenth Circuit Court for Kane County, Utah,

commit error in refusing to accept the Defendant's Motion to
Set Aside Conviction and Grant a New Trial on the grounds that
the Court lost jurisdiction over the case because the Defendant
had filed his Notice of Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals?
3)

Were the Defendant's constitutional rights to due

process of the law denied when the Tenth Circuit Court for
Kane County, Utah, failed to provide me with any notice of
a hearing on my Motion to Set Aside Conviction and Grant a
New Trial, thus preventing me from having my day in court
and from having the opportunity to present evidence and argument for the Court's consideration prior to the entry of the
Court's Order?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
1)

Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7.
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."

2)

Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 12.
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in
his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
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money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."
United States Constitution, Amendment V.
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
United States Constitution, Amendment VI.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartia
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for
his defence."
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section I.
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jursidiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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STATEMENT OF CASE
During the late summer of 1986, when the Defendant
was employed at the Bullfrog Marina on Lake Powell, the alleged
victim, Ed Klatenback, while in an intoxicated state, appeared
at the Defendant's trailer and began creating a disturbance
with another party who was at the Defendant's trailer*

The

Defendant asked the alleged victim to leave several times and
he continued in his refusal.

Without provocation, Mr. Klatenback

threw the liquid contents of a container he had been holding in
his hand into the face of the Defendant.

Defendant instinctively

struck back at Klatenback, hitting him twice in the head and
knocking him to the ground.

The Defendant then helped Klatenback

get back up, apologized for hitting him, explained that he didn't
want any trouble and that Klatenback should leave as he had been
asked to do several times, and went into his trailer to get a
wet rag for Klatenback as his mouth was bleeding.

Klatenback

then proceeded to leave, but before reaching his vehicle he fell
to the pavement striking his face directly on the pavement.

The

Defendant was not in close proximity to Klatenback at the time
he fell on the pavement, either from a physical standpoint or a
causal standpoint.
The Defendant was subsequently charged with Assault under
Utah Code Section 76-5-102(1)(a), a class B Misdemeanor.

His

defense to the charges was self-defense with respect to his
striking of Klatenback after Klatenback threw his drink into
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the Defendant's face and absolute denial with respect to Klatenback's fall on the pavement.
The original trial of this action occurred in the Justice
Court of Kane County.

The Defendant's witnesses did not appear

because of transportation problems and the Defendant was convicted
of the offense of Assault, not on the basis of the Defendant's
striking of Klatenback, which was found justified on the grounds
of self-defense, but because Klatenback and his friend testified
that the Defendant shoved Klatenback from his property causing
him to fall to the pavement and sustain injuries.
The Defendant then hired Ms. Elizabeth Joseph, an attorney
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah, to represent him
in an appeal of the original trial.

Because of the testimony

of Klatenback and his friend at the original trial and the Defendant's knowledge that at least four (4) other witnesses saw
the entire incident and would testify contrary to that of Klatenback and his witness and would corroborate the Defendant's version
of the facts, the Defendant provided the names and either the
addresses or relevant employment and residence information concerning these witnesses to his attorney so that these witnesses
could be secured for his new trial.

Defendant also made it clear

to his attorney that he wanted a jury trial.
Prior to the trial de novo in the Tenth Circuit Court in
Kane County, Utah, the Defendant's attorney either failed to
demand a jury trial or waived the Defendant's right to a jury
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trial.

Further, Defendant's attorney failed to subpoena any

of the witnesses whose names had been provided to her.

Even

though she had been in contact with one witness, who indicated
that he would appear and testify, that witness was not subpoenaed*
When he failed to appear at trial, because of what was later
learned to be transportation and weather problems, the Defendant
had no witnesses other than himself and was without just grounds
to request a continuance for the failure of a subpoenaed witness
to appear for trial.

Defendant was again convicted of the charge

on basically the same testimony of Klatenback and his friend, uncontroverted by any witness except the Defendant.

The trial was

to the Court and not to a jury, as the Defendant's attorney had
determined, upon her own judgment, that a trial to the Court was
preferable.

The Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County entered its

Judgment, Sentence, and Order of Probation on October 8, 1987.
The Defendant understood, from a telephone call with court
personnel at the Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County that he
had 30 days within which to file for a new trial.

In early

November, 1987, the Defendant filed both his Motion to Set Aside
Conviction and to Grant a New Trial and his Notice of Appeal
with the Tenth Circuit Court.

A response, objecting to the Motion,

was filed by the Kane County Attorney.

The Defendant's Motion

proceeded to hearing on December A, 1987, and was denied by
the Court because the Court had lost jurisdiction because the
Defendant had already filed his Notice of Appeal with the Utah
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Court of Appeals.

In fact, Defendant's Notice of Appeal was

not filed with the Court of Appeals until January 4, 1988(See
Exhibit C to the Defendant's previously filed Docketing Statement)
The Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County never notified the
Defendant of the hearing upon his Motion to Set Aside Conviction
and to Grant a New Trial, Defendant never received actual or constructive notice of that hearing, and the hearing proceeded to
conclusion without the Defendant ever knowing it was taking
place or having the opportunity to be heard.

Defendant would

have appeared for said hearing had he been given the opportunity.
Thereafter, the appeal process was begun in the Utah Court
of Appeals and has proceeded ever since.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1) The Defendant employed counsel, Elizabeth Joseph, to
represent him in the appeal of his conviction in the Justice
Court in Kane County to the Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County.
Ms. Joseph knew, well in advance of the trial, of at least four
witnesses who would corroborate the Defendant's version of the
facts surrounding the incident which lead to the Defendant being
charge with a criminal offense.

Because trial had already been

held in the Justice Court, she was also fully aware of the victim's expected testimony.

She was provided with sufficient

information to allow her to contact the Defendant's witnesses.
She had, in fact, contacted two of those witnesses prior to
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trial, one directly and one indirectly through his parents with
whom he resided.

The Defendant also demanded a jury trial, which

Ms. Joseph determined, prior to trial and in the exercise of her
independent judgment, and without the Defendant's consent, was
not necessary.

Ms. Joseph failed to subpoena any of the witnesses

whose names had been provided by the Defendant, even though she
was expecting the testimony of one, at least.

Her failure to

subpoena witnesses whose testimony she knew to be very material,
relevant, and contrary to that of the alleged victim, failed to
insure their appearance at trial and/or to provide a foundation
for a motion to continue the trial should they fail to appear.
When Defendant's witnesses did not appear, Defendant was left
without any corroborating testimony and was in no better trial
position than when he had been before the Justice Court, pro se.
Ms. Joseph's performance was deficient when measured by any
reasonable standard of professional performance and so prejudiced
the defense as to deprive the Defendant of a fair trial.
2)

The Tenth Circuit Court erred in denying the Defendant's

Motion to Set Aside Conviction and to Grant a New Trial upon its
finding that it had lost jurisdiction of this case because of the
prior filLng of the Notice of Appeal by the Defendant in the Court
of Appeals, when the Court of Appeal's own records reflect that
said Notice was not filed in that Court until January A, 1988.
3)

The Defendant's rights to due process of law, as guaran-

teed by both the Utah and United States Constitutions, were denied
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by the actions of the Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County in
failing to provide the Defendant with notice of the December 4,
1987, hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Set 'Aside Conviction
and to Grant a New Trial and, thus, denying the Defendant his
right to appear and be heard.

ARGUMENT
The United States Supreme Court, in its opinion in Strickland
1* Washiington,466 U.S. 668 (1984) set forth a two pronged test
which must be met in order to support a Defendant's claim that
counsel's assistance was so defective as to require the reversal
of a conviction.

The first test is that "counsel's performance

was deficient." The second test is that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of
a fair trial."

The Court expanded that the proper standard for

judging an attorney's performance is that of reasonable effective
assistance, considering all of the circumstances.

The Defendant

must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.

Further, the Court indicated that

the distorting effects of hindsight should be eliminated in
making a fair assessment of an attorney's performance.

Rather,

the conduct should be evaluated from counsel's perspective at
the time of counsel's actions.

The instant case presents a situa-

tion wherein the attorney for the Defendant was fully aware of
the problems resulting in the trial at the Justice Court and that

Page 1 2 — State v. Monson
Utah Court of Appeals No. 880002
Brief of Appellant

the remedy to those problems was to present testimony from other
independent witnesses contrary to the testimony of the alleged
victim and consistent with the testimony of the Defendant.

Counsel

had more than adequate time and information to secure the attendance of those witnesses through the subpoena powers of the Court.
The necessity, importance, and significance of these witnesses
and their testimony at trial should have been obvious to any
licensed attorney and the failure to insure their attendance
at trial falls below even the lowest objective standard of
reasonableness that could conceivably be set.
With regard to the required showing of prejudice, the Court
further elaborated that the Defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, except for the errors of his counsel,
the result of the trial would have been different.

The Court

further defines a reasonable probability as a probability which
is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the hearing
or trial.

That translates very simply into a probability suffi-

cient to cause question as to the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.

Defendant's position is

that the existence of even one witness in addition to the Defendant
whose testimony will contradict that of the alleged victim is sufficient to meet the threshhold question concerning the fundamental
fairness of the proceeding.

Exhibit A which is attached hereto

and incorporated herein is the affidavit of one, Anthony Colaizzi,
whose testimony would have clearly contradicted that of the alleged
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victim and supported that of the Defendant.

Exhibit B which is

also attached hereto and incorporated herein is a letter from
one, Mike Duran, reflecting like testimony.

Exhibit C which is

attached hereto and incorporated herein is a billing statement
from Defendant's counsel to Defendant, reflecting a total of
nineteen minutes of professional services provided by Defendant's
counsel to Defendant between April A, 1987, and May 3, 1987, and
reflects that counsel for the Defendant had directly contacted
one of the witnesses and knew of the whereabouts and was able to
contact a second witness.

The first witness referred to by the

Defendant's counsel in her billing statement, Kris Zolager, was
expected to be present at court as indicated by defense counsel's
note on her billing statement.

It is a fair assumption and in-

ference that his testimony would also have been supportive of the
Defendant's position.
No hindsight is necessary at all to see the unprofessional
errors on the part of Defendant's counsel and the deficiencies
in her representation of the Defendant.
The significance of the failure of Defendant's counsel to
try this matter before a jury is not capable of being fully and
fairly evaluated because of the extreme nature in defense counsel's
errors in failing to subpoena Defendant's witnesses.
In Exhibit D which is attached hereto and incorporated herein,
the affidavit of Elizabeth Joseph, Defendant's counsel, Ms. Joseph
indicates that she received permission from the Defendant's mother
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that it was acceptable to not subpoena Mr. Zolager.

On the other

hand, Ms. Joseph indicates that she made the independent judgment
concerning the vacating of the jury trial and obtained the approval
of both the Defendant and Defendant's mother to simply try the
matter to the court.

Although Defendant and his mother would

deny that allegation, it is somewhat inconsistent for counsel
to make such a significant decision independently and to go
forward and convince her client of the propriety of her decision,
while avoiding the same or a similar approach with respect to the
importance and significance of subpoenaeing witnesses necessary to
the Defendant's case.

If Ms. Joseph could have talked the Defen-

dant out of a jury trial, she certainly could have talked them
into subpoenaeing witnesses had she properly and professionally
evaluated that issue.
Additionally, with respect to the credibility of the affidavit
of Defendant's counsel, that affidavit, and paragraph 5 in particular
seem to imply that Defendant's counsel was limited in her ability
to locate the witnesses to only one of them.

Her billing statement

would at least indicate to the contrary.
A consideration of all of the circumstances of this case
leads to the conclusion that the performance of Defendant's
counsel was deficient and that that deficient performance prejudiced the Defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial.
Defendant's rights, as argued above, are guaranteed to him
by Sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and Amendments V,
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VI, and XIV of the United States Constitution*

Consideration of

the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is addressed by
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Malmrose(Utah 1982)649 P.2d 56,
Codianna v. Morris (Utah 1983)660 P.2d 1101, and State v. Frame
(Utah 1986) 723 P.2d 401.

See also 74 A.L.R. 2d 1390.

Although in its Order denying the Defendant's Motion to Set
Aside Conviction and Grant a New Trial the Tenth Circuit Court
indicated that the Defendant's Motion was not timely filed, the
Court's order was based on the more significant finding that the
Court was without jurisdiction.

The timliness of the filing of

Defendant's Motion is moot if the Court is without jurisdiction.
Had the Court found that it had continuing jurisdiction, the
question of the timliness of the Motion should have been dealt
with pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which, in subsection (a) appears to grant
the Court authority to order a new trial upon its own initiative
without the time limits fixed upon the parties for filing motions
requesting such a remedy.

The Court's error in denying juris-

diction based on an erroneous date of filing of the Notice of
Appeal renders that order in error, the January 8, 1988, letter
from Julia Whitfield to the Defendant establishing a filing date
of the Notice of Appeal significantly later than that indicated
by the court.
The Court's record reflects that no notice was provided to
the Defendant concerning the December 4, 1987 # hearing upon
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Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Conviction and Grant a New Trial.
The Motion was not determined simply on the pleadings, as the Court's
Order indicates that the Plaintiff was present in court and represented by the Kane County Attorney.

Defendant had no actual or

constructive notice concerning this hearing.
The essentials of due process are set forth in the Court's
opinion in Christiansen v. Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P.2d 314. Two
of the six essentials set forth are "(c) notice to the person of
the inauguration and purpose of the inquiry and the time at which
such person should appear if he wishes to be heard; and (d) right
to appear in person or by counsel."

Simply stated, the Defendant

must have had notice of the hearing and the opportunity to be heard
before he could have been bound by that order in light of the due
process requirements.

The Defendant's rights to due process of the

law are guaranteed by Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

CONCLUSION
1)

Defendant's constitutional rights pursuant to Amendments

V, VI, and XIV of the United States Constitution and to Sections
7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution were seriously and severely
denied by the unprofessional errors of his counsel at trial, those
errors establishing both the deficiency in his counsel's performance and the prejudice to the Defendant's defense resulting in
the Defendant being deprived of the fundamental fairness to which
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he was entitled at trial.
2)

The actions of the Tenth Circuit Court in Kane County

in addressing the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Conviction and
Grant a New Trial were based upon erroneous facts and denied the
Defendant his due process rights in failing to provide him notice
of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant-Appellant respectfully prays that
this Court enter its Order reversing the conviction previously
entered against the Defendant in the Tenth Circuit Court in Kane
County, Utah, and dismissing the charge against the Defendant.
In the alternative, and at a minimum in theinterests of fundamental
fairness as assured by the relevant constitutional provisions
herein, the Court should reverse the conviction and remand the
matter for a fair and impartial trial.

Respectfully submitted this 29th day of April, 1988.

ROBERT X MONSON
Defendant Pro Se
909 South 7th Street
Montrose, Colorado 80401
303/249-1089
Proof of Service
I hereby certify that I duly mailed (4) true and correct copies
of the above Brief of Appellant this 29th day of April, 1988, to
the Kane County Attorney, 70 North Main, Kanab, Utah, 84741, by
depositing the same in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid.
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BILL for PROFESSIONAL SERVICES

submi tted to:

Robert Monson
909 South Seventh
Montrose, CO 81401

submitted for:

criminal defense (4 April - 3 May

£9 April
3 May

1987)

telephone conference: Kris Zolager
trial preparation scheduling
TOTAL TIME:
TOTAL DUE (at $60/hour):

8 minutes
11 minutes
.32 hour
$ 19.20

TOTAL DUE THIS BILLING:
PREVIOUS CREDIT:

$ 19.20
$269.11

CURRENT CREDIT:

$249.91

3 May 1987

osepii
Attorney at Law
Bob-~Zolager will be there; I haven't talked to D u r a n — h e
apparently comes home later than his parents are willing to have
calls; I'll keep tryingSee you on the 15th.

S T A T E OF UTAH

)
•
C O U N T Y OF KANE )

s• s •

ELIZABETH JOSEPH
1.

T h a t she

hereby

states on her

is an attorney

duly

oath:

licensed

to p r a c t i c e

law

in

the S t a t e of U t a h .
2.

T h a t she represented

a Class B misdemeanor

charge of assault

the Tenth C i r c u i t C o u r t
charge

in Kane C o u n t y

in the J u s t i c e C o u r t of Kane

3.

That

generally

t h r o u g h o u t her

unavailable

in the case and

speak

in his d e f e n s e

in a de novo a p p e a l

of

to

from a c o n v i c t i o n on

the

County.

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of M r . M o n s o n , he w a s

by telephone and he

his mother J o a n n e could
made

R o b e r t J. M o n s o n

instructed A f f i a n t

for him regarding d e c i s i o n s

that

to be

that A f f i a n t was to follow M r s . M o n s o n ' s

directives.
4.

That Affiant estimates

c o n f e r e n c e s with M r s . M o n s o n
5.

she had

throughout

That M r s . M o n s o n provided

witnesses

to the

incident giving

son which

she represented

would

30 to 40

telephone

the c o u r s e of the c a s e .

to A f f i a n t

the n a m e s of

four

rise to the c h a r g e s a g a i n s t
substantiate

his version of

her
the

incident.

S h e , h o w e v e r , had no a d d r e s s e s

for any of them and

last n a m e s

for

one

two of

them.

She provided

for one of them, a C h r i s Z o l a g e r , and
provide
6.

locations

for

telephone

indicated

he could

number
possibly

the o t h e r s .

T h a t M r . Zolager w a s not at the number p r o v i d e d

M o n s o n , but A f f i a n t w a s referred
numbers, eventually

no

to a s e r i e s of other

reaching M r . Z o l a g e r .

by M r s .

phone
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7.

*

That Mr. Zolager told Affiant he did not know the

location of the other witnesses.
available to testify.

He indicated he would be

Affiant told him that with a subpoena, he

would be entitled to witness fees and expenses but that the costs
of service of that subpoena would have to be borne by Mr. Monson
unless service could be effected when he came to the trial.

Mr.

Zolager said he did not wish to add to Mr. Monson's costs and
promised he would appear to testify.

Affiant and Mr. Zolager hac

an extensive discussion about the date of trial, his plans for
transportation, and the route to Kanab.
8.

That Affiant later confirmed by a telephone call to Mr.

Zolager that he would attend the trial.
9.

That Affiant informed Mrs. Monson of the situation with*

Mr. Zolager and the other witnesses, and she indicated the
arrangements Affiant had made were satisfactory.
10. That Affiant requested a jury trial on Mr. Monson's
behalf when the trial date was set.
11. That as Affiant prepared for trial, it was her judgment
that the case would turn on the question of self-defense (which,
in fact, it did). Affiant, having trial experience before Judge
David L. Mower, determined Mr. Monson's chances of acquittal
would be better if the matter was tried to the bench rather than
to a jury.

It was Affiant's judgment that Judge Mower is a

meticulous jurist with great respect for legal principles and
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*

that it would be easier to make a clean presentation of Mr.
Monson's defense, which Affiant believed would enhance his
chances of acquittal, to the bench rather than to a jury.
12. That Affiant has extensive experience with Kane County
juries, which tend to be conservative and prone to conviction in
cases involving close calls.
13. That Affiant obtained both Mrs. and Mr. Monson's
clearance to withdraw the request for a jury.
14. That the case against Mr. Monson focused on two events:
two punches thrown by Mr. Monson following the victim pitching a
drink in his face and Mr. Monson's subsequent removal of the
victim from his property.
15. That the Court found the first two punches were
instinctive and beyond Mr. Monson's control but ruled the manner
in which Mr. Monson removed the victim from his property
constituted an assault.
16. That the testimony indicated the victim sustained
extensive dental damage in the fall he incurred when Mr. Monson
removed him from his property.

The victim's tooth was recovered

by police officers at that site.

The testimony was the victim

was nearly unconscious when he was removed from the property.
17. That on cross-examination, Mr. Monson admitted to
several other incidents where he had resorted to physical
violence although he maintained they were all self-defense.
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18. That it is Affiant's judgment that Mr. Monson received a
fair trial with adequate and competent representation.

Affiant

fully concurred in all the decisions made by Affiant which he is
now criticizing.
DATED this 26th day of February 1988.

ELIZABETH JOSEPH*

STATE OF UTAH
S. S.

COUNTY OF KANE
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of February
1988.

J^IVJ1- -1^5- 1
NOTARY ^PUBLIC residing at Big Water
my, commission expires 8-12-89

